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THE DUAL-CLASS SHARE STRUCTURE
Olivia Wang∗
In September, 2014, Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. (hereinafter Alibaba),
China’s dominant electronic commerce company, brought about one of the
biggest initial public offerings (IPO) in the stock market.1 Alibaba’s IPO
revealed that the company adopted a dual-class share structure.2 This dualclass share structure first aroused the author’s concern when the author learned
that the reason why Alibaba chose to go public in the United States was that
the US stock exchanges allow companies going public adopt a share structure
different than the normal “one share one vote” structure. In Part I of this Essay,
the author gives a brief description of how the availability of the dual-class
share structure in the US stock market became an attraction. Then in Part II the
Essay goes on to discuss in more detail that why Alibaba (and some internet
companies and high-tech companies, see below for more detail) insists on this
structure. The author found that such structure contributes to innovations and
seems to enable efficient decision-making process. In Part III, however, the
author will show that the dual-class share structure is a double-edged sword.
The structure would impede checks on managements, which makes the
shareholders in a dual-class share company less protected.
I. DUAL-CLASS SHARE STRUCTURES IS THE REASON WHY ALIBABA CHOSE
TO GO PUBLIC IN THE UNITED STATES
Dual-class share structure allow insiders to hold common stock with
multiple votes per share, while the public holds common stock with only one
vote per share.3 National Association of Securities Dealers Automatic
∗ Managing Editor elect, Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review; J.D. Candidate,
Emory University School of Law (2016). I would like to thank Joseph Tabler for his guidance during the early
stages of this perspective, and Drew Case for his assistance during the drafting process that helped me develop
this piece to its full potential.
1 Telis Demos, Rolfe Winkler and Matt Jarzemsky, Alibaba Targets $155 Billion Value in IPO, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/alibaba-to-set-ipo-price-range-at-60-66-a-share1409946492?KEYWORDS=alibaba.
2 See Alibaba Group Holding Ltd., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (May 6, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browseedgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001577552&owner=include&count=40.
3 Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote
Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 687 (1986).
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Quotation System (NASDAQ) and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) both
allow companies with the dual-class share structure to list on the securities
exchanges.4 Not all stock exchanges allow this kind of deviation from the basic
“one share one vote” shareholder structure. For example, Hong Kong Stock
Exchange (HKEx) in its listing rules clearly states:
The share capital of a new applicant must not include shares of which
the proposed voting power does not bear a reasonable relationship to
the equity interest of such shares when fully paid (“B Shares”). The
Exchange will not be prepared to list any new B Shares issued by a
listed issuer nor to allow any new B Shares to be issued by a listed
issuer (whether or not listing for such shares is to be sought on the
Exchange or any other stock exchange) except: (1) in exceptional
circumstances agreed with the Exchange. . .5

So far, HKEx has denied the use of the “exceptional circumstances” exception
by any applicants,6 including Alibaba.7 Alibaba has repeatedly confirmed its
determination to keep the current shareholder structure.8 After receiving
written confirmation from the NYSE that its dual-class share structure
wouldn’t be an obstacle for a U.S. listing,9 Alibaba picked NYSE for its IPO.10
II. DUAL-CLASS SHARE STRUCTURES HAS ITS ADVANTAGES
Besides Alibaba, several internet companies, e.g. Google11, Facebook12,
Groupon13, LinkedIn14, etc., went public with a dual-class share structure as

4

Id.
Hong Kong Stock Exchange Main Board Listing Rule 8.11.
6 David Graham, Chief Regulatory Officer and Head of Listing of HKEx, Weighted Voting Rights
Concept
Paper
(Aug.
29,
2014),
available
at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/hkexnews/2014/Documents/1408292news.pdf.
7 See Enda Curran, How Hong Kong Lost the Alibaba IPO, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303546204579440820673013810?mg=id-wsj
(“Alibaba
Group Holding Ltd.’s planned listing in New York is a blow to Hong Kong’s stock exchange, which failed in
an effort to change its rules so as to accommodate what could be one of the world’s biggest initial public
offerings.”).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Leslie Picker and Sam Mamudi, Alibaba Picks New York Stock Exchange for IPO, BLOOMBERG (June
26, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-26/alibaba-picks-new-york-stock-exchange-as-venuefor-largest-ipo.html.
11 See
Google
Inc.,
Registration
Statement
(Form
S-1)
(Apr.
29,
2004),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/ds1.htm.
12 See
Facebook,
Inc.,
Registration
Statement
(Form
S-1)
(Feb.
1,
2012),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/d287954ds1.htm.
5
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well. Dual-class share structure is popular for a reason, and this Part II
describes in both general and specific ways as to how this structure benefits
internet or high-tech companies.
For management in general, the benefit of dual-class share structure is
obvious. With the superior voting rights in hand, although an IPO will reduce
the management’s proportion of stock ownership, management has no concern
with their control over the company being diluted.15 Non-controlling
shareholders, in turn, are protected from conducting coercive takeover and
from making mistakes with regard to the daily operation or management of the
company.16 The latter argument is supported by the so-called “short-termism”
concerns.17 Short-termism refers to companies taking actions that are profitable
in the short term but do no good to the companies in the long term.18 A typical
example of short-termism is that a company, under the pressure of activist
investors, seeks to increase short-term earnings by cutting research that would
be beneficial in the long run.19 Such long-term costs of short-termism are
mainly produced by both shareholder interventions and management’s fears of
such interventions.20 Therefore, shield boards from activist shareholders are
desirable among managements, which hope to better serve the long-term
interests of companies and their shareholders.21 Dual-class share structure is
one way to meet this goal of board insulation.
For internet or technology companies, dual-class share structure is highly
valued because such structure contributes to innovations that would hardly
generate short-term benefits, but would probably bring better future lives. In a
letter to its shareholders, founders of Google stated: “outside pressures . . .
often tempt companies to sacrifice long-term opportunities to meet quarterly

13 See
Groupon,
Inc.,
Registration
Statement
(Form
S-1)
(June
2,
2011),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1490281/000104746911005613/a2203913zs-1.htm.
14 See
LinkedIn Corporation, Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Nov. 3, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1490281/000104746911005613/a2203913zs-1.htm.
15 Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 Va. L. Rev.
807, 812 (1987).
16 Id. at 811.
17 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 Colum. L. Rev.
1637, 1638 (2013).
18 Id. at 1638-39.
19 Id. at 1639.
20 Id.
21 Id.
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market expectations.”22 With regard to Google’s insist on dual-class share
structure, the letter explained that Google “designed a corporate structure that
is will to protect Google’s ability to innovate.”23 Indeed, Google glass and
Google driverless car are good examples of innovations without short-term
benefits but with a view to future life. Such freedom in developing high
technology attributes to some extent to Google’s shareholder structure. In
contrast, Apple Inc. does not have a dual-class share structure, and it is likely
that shareholder actions might bring Apple to a dilemma. A recent noteworthy
case is that hedge fund manager David Einhorn urged Apple to start
distributing to shareholders some of the large cash holdings it had
accumulated.24
As an electronic commerce giant with multiple services available, Alibaba
is seeking both the expansion on its current services to other countries besides
China, but also innovations that better serve the goal of development and
cooperation in the future. For example, Alibaba opened an institution named
“AliResearch” in April, 2007.25 This institution aims at building up a business
knowledge sharing platform that provides business data analysis, and
successful cases of mom-and pop shops or other types of small businesses.26
One significant business data AliResearch provides is called “internet
Shopping Price Index (iSPI)”, a product of AliResearch’s cooperation with
scholars and the National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of
China, which function is to indicate the general price level of goods or services
trade in two of Alibaba’s flagship online retail platforms, Taobao and
Tmall.com.27 In addition, AliResearch also put efforts into building up a digital
library that covers data information from areas of trade, finance, map, life
services, etc.28 Right now the library has 58 billion books collection, amount to
100PB data information.29 These data enable online merchants to obtain the the
big picture of their industry, the market profile of their brands, and consumer
22 See Larry Page & Sergey Brin, Letter from the Founders, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 29, 2004),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB108326432110097510.
23 Id.
24 See Einhorn’s Letter: Dear Fellow Apple Shareholder, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2013/02/07/einhorns-letter-dear-fellow-apple-shareholder/.
25 AliResearch, About Us (阿阿阿阿阿， 关关关们), http://www.aliresearch.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 8,
2014).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Tao Yajie, Alibaba Steps into Big Data (陶娅娅, 十十十十剑阿阿十十十十十十十), SINA FINANCE (May 22,
2014) http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20140522/012319184737.shtml.
29 Id.
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behaviors relating to their online shopping.30 Building up a Big Data platform
is both time-consuming and costly, however, once successful, it will bring
major impact to the electronic commerce industry. Public investors are likely
to disfavor a long-term project like AliResearch merely because its lack of
short-term benefits. It is fair to conclude that Alibaba’s dual-class share
structure makes the Big Data dream possible to come true.
III. DANGERS IN DUAL-CLASS STRUCTURE
Although dual-class share structure has its advantages, it seems to be
disfavored by investors. In recent years Council of Institutional Investors (CII)
expressed to NYSE and NASDAQ several times its request of going back to
the principle of one share, one vote.31 In one of the letters CII specifically
expressed that it was disappointed that NYSE allowed the listing of Alibaba
after Alibaba was reportedly denied listing by HKEx.32 In the view of longterm investors, some of the worthy goals, such as “enhancing the
accountability of the listed companies”, and “allowing shareholders to more
easily and efficiently monitor performance of directors”, are undermined by
the listing of Alibaba with a dual-class share structure.33 In addition, some
scholars also challenged the view that shareholder intervention with short-term
orientation leads management to initiate and take actions that are profitable in
the short term but detrimental in the long term. 34 In examining investor’s
concerns with dual-class share structure, this Part proceeds in three stages.
First, section A discusses what dangers the dual-class share structure may
bring to the public investors. Second, section B examines the “short-termism”
concerns and the challenges against such claim.
A. Dual-class Share Structure Eliminates Market Checks on Managerial
Misconduct
Companies like Alibaba with their dual-class share structure are more
likely to have concentration of power, which easily defeats checks on
managerial misconduct. Pursuant to Alibaba’s articles of association, Alibaba
30

Id.
See, e.g., Letter from CII to NYSE on One Share, One Vote, (Mar. 27, 2014), available at
http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2014/03_27_14_CII_letter_to_NYSE_one_shar
e_one_vote.pdf.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See Bebchuk, supra note 17, at 1658.
31
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Partnership is the management, which currently comprises of 28 members—22
members of the management and six members of the management of the
related companies and affiliates.35 Alibaba Partnership has the exclusive right
to nominate a simple majority of the board of directors of the company. In its
registration statement Alibaba also stated that they expected to enter into a
voting agreement pursuant to which both SoftBank (now owns 34.1% shares of
Alibaba) and Yahoo (now owns 22.4% shares of Alibaba) will agree to vote
their shares in favor of the Alibaba Partnership director nominees at each
annual general shareholders meeting.36 This meant that, while Alibaba’s
founder Jack Ma and the co-founder and vice chairman Joe Tsai collectively
held 13.4% of total shares outstanding, they are able to hold the majority of
shareholder’s total voting power.37
In a public traded corporation in which each share has equal voting power,
the corporate governance works in a way that shareholders elect the board of
directors, which in turn perform the function of monitoring possible
mismanagement or self-dealing by those in control of the corporation, and
selects the officers who run the corporation.38 In contrast, in a company like
Alibaba, dual-class share structure defeats the oversight function of the board,
because the directors are impeded from exercising the fiduciary duties, fearing
that they can be fired by a single person.39
There is a precedent that could further corroborate the concern raised in this
section. In 2011, Yahoo, one of the majority shareholder of Alibaba at that
time, claimed that it was blindsided when Alibaba transferred ownership of
Alipay, which is often treated as the Chinese counterpart of Paypal, to a new
company owned by Alibaba CEO and founder, Jack Ma.40 Softbank, a Japanbased company that also owns a major share of Alibaba, declared the same
thing.41 On the other side, Mr. Ma said that the transfer was legal—due to the
operation of the dual-class structure.42 No doubt that Yahoo and Softbank

35

Alibaba Registration Statement at 14.
Id.at 46
37 See id at 46.
38 Tian Wen, You Can’t Sell Your Firm and Own It Too: Disallowing Dual-class Stock Companies from
Listing on the Securities Exchanges, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2014) (citing ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1933), at 86-87).
39 Id.
40 Amir Efrati, Yahoo, Alibaba Reach Alipay Agreement, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303745304576358002657500050.
41 Id.
42 Id.
36
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were annoyed, but later the two majority shareholders reached an agreement
with Alibaba to resolve their dispute over the ownership transfer of Alipay.43
According to the agreement, Alipay stayed with Mr. Ma’s company, while Mr.
Ma promised not to use Alipay to siphon off revenue of Taobao, a Chinese
counterpart of Ebay or Amazon.44 As two of the biggest shareholders of
Alibaba, Yahoo and Softbank had limited options in the face of the insider
control. One could imagine the difficulties for most minority shareholders to
protect themselves if this kind of blindsighting ever occurs again.
In addition to the lack of traditional oversight by the board, the NYSE rules
“help” Alibaba Partnership to exercise their power even more freely by saying
that companies with dual-class share structure that fall under the definition of a
“controlled company” are not required to have independent directors on the
board.45 At least in theory, independent directors ensure that corporate officers
do not abuse their authority or shirk their responsibilities.46 Therefore, for
those dual-class companies that are qualified as controlled companies,
shareholders lack another safeguard against managements’ self-dealing or
misconduct.
It is worth attention that if a company with dual-class share structure results
in insufficient board accountability, shareholders are not the only ones that
suffer.47 Once the traditional monitoring function of boards does not work, it
will be transferred to third parties, such as the courts and the government, and
the public will be forced to bear the costs.48
B. Dual-class Share Structure Is No Guarantee to Long-term Benefits
The argument that dual-class share structure saves a company from meeting
the needs of short-sighted individuals and would benefit the company in the
long run needs a second thought. As mentioned in Part II, short-termism
concerns are regularly invoked to explain corporate failures and crises.49 The
43

Id.
Id.
45 See
NYSE
Listed
Company
Manual,
§ 303A.00
(2014),
available
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/, (“A listed company of which more than 50% of the voting power for
election of directors is held by an individual, a group or another company is not required to comply with
requirements of Sections 303A.01, 303A.04 or 303A.05.” Sections 303A.01, 303A.04 or 303A.05
provisions that require listed companies to have certain amount of independent directors on the board.).
46 Wen, supra note 38, at 1500.
47 Id. at1499.
48 Id.
49 Bebchuk, supra note 17, at 1646-47.
44

at
the
the
are
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popularity of this claim makes a good defense for the arrangements of board
insulation such as a dual-class share structure.50 However, evidence supports
the view that, instead of bringing out value-reducing actions in the long-term,
shareholder’s intervening with companies provides long-term benefits to
companies, shareholders, and the economy.51
One source of evidence is an empirical study by Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and
Lucian Bebchuk on the long-term effects of hedge fund activism.52 This study
indicates that activist shareholders target companies whose operating
performance lags behind peers, and these interventions are followed by
consistent and long-term improvements in operating performance.53 The
conclusion to this study is that, taking a long-term perspective, the market does
not fail to appreciate the long-term consequences of activism as insulation
advocates fear it does.54 Rather, the stock appreciation accompanying activists’
initial announcement reflects the market’s correct anticipation of the
intervention’s effect, and the initial positive stock reactions is not reversed in
the long term.
Some other studies indicate that board insulation eliminates or substantially
weakens insiders’ incentives to better serve shareholders.55 One study by
Ronald Masulis, Cong Wang, and Fei Xie demonstrates that firms with
classified boards are more likely to be associated with undesirable acquisition
decisions—that is, acquisition announcements that the market determines is
value-reducing.56
In addition, there is evidence that dual-class share structure enables
managers to increase their own benefits.57 A study by Kenneth Borokhovich,
Kelly Brunarski, and Robert Parino found that managers of companies with
stronger antitakeover defenses enjoy higher compensation levels.58

50

Id.
Id. at 1644.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1679.
56 Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns, 62 J. FIN.
1851, 1883 (2007).
57 Bebchuk, supra note 17, at 1680.
58 Kenneth A. Borokhovich, Kelly R. Brunarski & Robert Parrino, CEO Contracting and Antitakeover
Amendments, 52 J. FIN. 1495 (1997).
51
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In sum, the above mentioned studies clearly show that dual-class share
structure has adverse effect on building a diligent and efficient board. On one
hand, directors lack the incentive to better serve shareholders and the
companies. On the other, the relative insulated structure prevent or delay the
replacement of leaders once the leaders prove to be ill-suited for their
positions.59 Because it is important for a company to be led by individuals who
are well suited for their roles, the relative insulation of the board in a dual-class
company represents significant costs in the long run.60
One example is Reader’s Digest Association, which had a dual-class share
structure and was controlled by two nonprofit philanthropic foundations
created by its founders.61 The goals of the controlling persons, driven by a need
to fund their own projects, were not aligned with those of the shareholders—
while investors generally want the board to determine what is in the best
interest of all shareholders in order to create long-term value, the board ended
up issuing dividends in excess of cash flows.62
By examining the abovementioned studies and cases, this Part defeats the
short-termism concerns as a justification of dual-class share structure. Once we
see the potential risk for a dual-class company in the long run, dual-class share
structure seems unnecessary.
CONCLUSION
Alibaba’s IPO brought attention to its dual-class share structure. Dual-class
share structure enables companies, especially those that are high-tech or
internet-driven, to bring innovations to the table. However, no matter what
benefits dual-class share structure may bring, this structure has the nature of
board insulation, which in turn impedes checks on management. Although the
right to bring a class action lawsuit against insiders is available to the
shareholders in a company with dual-class share structure. Whether this
mechanism provides shareholders with sufficient protection remains to be
seen. What’s more, the justification for the dual-class share structure—that
short-term results pressures directors to focus excessively on these short-term
results—is contested by several empirical studies that show that the dual-class
59

Bebchuk, supra note 17, at 1680.
Id. at 1681.
61 Wen, supra note 38, at 1499 (summarizing the comments of Michael S. Geltziler, Executive Vice
President and CFO of NYSE).
62 Id.
60
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share structure is no guarantee to long-term benefits. Given that any kinds of
extra monitoring mechanism are unavailable currently under the legal system,
NYSE and other stock exchange market need to seriously consider the
appropriateness of keeping the soft rule of allowing dual-class share structure.

